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The Delaware legislature recently passed an amendment to the Delaware
General Corporation Law that allows shareholders to vote to relieve directors
of financial liability for breaches of the fiduciary duty of care.' The new
Delaware law will create a tremendous impact in the law of corporations.
2
Currently, over one-half of the Fortune 500 companies3 and approximately
forty percent of the corporations traded on the New York Stock Exchange
are incorporated in Delaware.4 Thus Delaware corporation law occupies a
significant position in the business arena.' Moreover, courts must accord full
faith and credit to Delaware corporation law in actions involving companies
organized in Delaware but operating elsewhere, thus extending Delaware's
1. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. VIII, § 102 (b)(7) (1986). Section 102 (b)(7) of the new Delaware
amendment provides that:
A provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a director to the
corporation or its stockholders for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty
as a director, provided that such provision shall not eliminate or limit the liability
of a director (i) for any breach of the director's duty of loyalty to the corporation
or its stockholders, (ii) for acts or omissions not in good faith or which involve
intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of the law, (iii) under section 174 of
the Title, or (iv) for any transaction from which the director derived an improper
personal benefit. No such provision shall eliminate or limit the liability of a director
for any act or omission occurring prior to the date when such provision becomes
effective. All references in this subsection to a director shall also be deemed to refer
to a member of the governing body of a corporation which is not authorized to
issue capital stock.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. VIII, § 102 (b)(7) (1986). See infra notes 13-23 and accompanying text
(describing provisions of § 102 (b)(7) of Delaware General Corporation Law).
2. See infra notes 5-8 and accompanying text (discussing nationwide application of
Delaware law through full faith and credit clause, conflict of laws rules, and Erie doctrine);
see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAwVs § 2, § 2 comment a, § 5 comment a,
§ 6, § 6 comment b, § 93 (1967) (defining and explaining conflict of laws and full faith and
credit clause); IA J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § .310 (2d ed. 1981) (describing
effect of Erie doctrine on choice of law issue); Hill, The Erie Doctrine and the Constitution,
53 N.W. L. REv. 427, 428 (1958) [hereinafter Hill] (describing Erie doctrine).
3. See Kanner, A Trimmer 'Fortune' Carries Its Weight Well After 50 Years, ADVER-
TISiNO AGE, Feb. 4, 1980, at 32 (originating in 1955, Fortune's list of top 500 corporations is
most well-known magazine ranking of businesses).
4. See Black, A National Law of Takeovers Evolves in Delaware, Legal Times, Nov.
25, 1985, at 6, col. 1 (describing Delaware's historical importance in corporation law); Herzel
& Richman, Delaware's Preeminence by Design, I Tm DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND
BUSINESS ORGANIZAIONS lix, lix (1985) [hereinafter DELAxvARE LAw] (tracing development of
Delaware's popularity as a state of incorporation).
5. See DELAwAR LAw, supra note 4, at Ilx (discussing Delaware's importance in
business community).
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influence nationwide.6 Finally, conflicts of law rules7 and the Erie doctrine'
often require federal courts to rely on both the Delaware code and Delaware
case law when deciding cases involving Delaware corporations. 9
Delaware historically has been a haven for big businesses seeking an
attractive climate for incorporation. 0 The Delaware General Assembly has
6. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (full faith and credit clause); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF Co NFIcT OF LAWS § 2 comment b (1967) (describing full faith and credit clause). The full
faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution and its enabling provision set forth
the effect that each state must give to acts, records, and proceedings of a sister state.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 2 comment b (1967). The clause requires states
to recognize and enforce a valid judgment that another state issued. Id. at § 93.
7. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 2 (1967). Conflict of laws is
an issue of state law that determines which law courts must apply in a case in which the
parties have a significant relationship with more than one state. Id. A state may declare its
own policy on conflict of laws. Id. at § 5 comment a. In many cases, a court, however, will
find no specific statute prescribing the conflict of laws treatment of the fact situation before
the court. Id. at § 6 comment b. In the absence of statutory language, courts may consider
in making the choice of law decision such factors as the needs of the interstate system, relevant
policies of the forum state, basic policies underlying the particular field of law, and certainty,
predictability, and uniformity of result. Id. at § 6; see Beard v. Elster, 160 A.2d 731, 735
(Del. 1960) (holding that issuance of New York stock option plans by Delaware corporation
involved internal affairs of Delaware corporation and, therefore, was subject to Delaware law
rather than New York law); Great Western Producers Co-op. v. Great Western United Corp.,
200 Colo. 180, , 613 P.2d 873, 878 (Colo. 1980) (Colorado court imposed upon directors of
Delaware corporation duties of fidelity, good faith, and prudence in accordance with Delaware
case law and statutes).
8. See Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (holding that federal court
must apply state substantive law); Hill, supra note 2, at 428. In accordance with the Erie
doctrine, federal courts must use state law to decide matters that are clearly substantive. Hill
at 428. In addition, federal courts must apply state law which is outcome determinative in the
case. Id. Outcome determinative laws are laws that substantially or significantly affect the
result of litigation. Id. The underlying rationale of the Erie doctrine is that the result of
federal court litigation should be substantially the same as if the state court tried the action.
Id.
9. See IA J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § .310 (1981) (stating that federal
courts must follow state law on matters of corporate liability); see, e.g., Burks v. Lasker, 441
U.S. 471, 475 (1979) (holding that state law governed authority of independent directors to
discontinue shareholder derivative suits in cases brought under Investment Company Act of
1940 and Investment Advisor's Act of 1940); Santa Fe Industries v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479
(1977) (holding that state law controlled corporation law rather than federal law); Abbey v.
Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724, 728-29 (8th Cir. 1979) cert. den. 444 U.S. 1017 (1980)
(court used Delaware case law to analyze application of business judgment rule to directors'
termination of shareholder derivative action because company was incorporated in Delaware);
Perlman v. Feldman, 219 F.2d 173, 175 (2d Cir. 1955) cert. den. 349 U.S. 952 (1955) (court
determined fiduciary duty of majority shareholder to minority shareholder by laws of state of
incorporation).
10. See Moore, A Brief History of the General Corporation Law of Delaware and the
Amendatory Process, 1 THE DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS ANm BusiNESS ORoAIZATONS
lxxv, lxxxiv (1985) (describing historical development of Delaware corporation law). In 1913,
New Jersey Governor Woodrow Wilson's antitrust acts outlawed trusts and holding companies
in New Jersey. Id. at lxxxiv. As a result, Delaware enjoyed an influx of corporations looking
for a new, more congenial base. Id. In the next decades, the federal securities acts of the
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stated as public policy the desire to treat corporations favorably." Delaware
has retained the lead position in the competition between states to attract
incorporating businesses through a melding of the policies of the legislature
and the structure and support of the Delaware judicial system.'
2
The most recent legislative modification of the Delaware corporation law
added section 102 (b)(7) (the amendment), 3 which enables shareholders of a
corporation to vote to include a provision in the articles of incorporation
1930's tightened corporate regulations thus eliminating many attractive features of the Delaware
law. Id. In addition, revised corporate laws in other states limited somewhat Delaware's
incorporation business. Id. at lxxxv. In 1967, however, the Delaware General Assembly
approved a major update of the general Corporation Law in an effort to attract businesses to
incorporate in Delaware. Id. at xc. The aim of the update was to clarify existing language,
simplify the mechanics of the statute, and make substantive improvements in the law. Id. at
lxxxvii.
11. See Preamble, 54 DEL. LAws 724 (1963) (declaration of legislature's policy to support
corporations).
12. See Black, supra note 4, at 6. The Delaware court system has developed a specialized
and efficient forum for processing corporate claims in the Court of Chancery. Id. The court
consists of a chancellor and three vice chancellors, has no juries, and operates much like an
appellate court. Id. The vast number of issues appearing before the chancery court has led to
an advanced development of Delaware's corporate law. Id. In addition, judicial rules facilitating
obtaining personal jurisdiction over defendants and awarding attorney's fees as a percentage
of the outcome of the litigation, add to the attractiveness of the Delaware court system. Herzel
& Richman, Delaware's Preeminence by Design, DELaAwARE LAW at lxiii (1985); see supra
notes 9-10 and accompanying text (describing Delaware legislature's support of corporations).
13. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. VIII, § 102 (b)(7) (effective date July 1, 1986); see supra note
1 and accompanying text (setting forth text of Delaware amendment § 102 (b)(7)). In addition
to section 102 (b)(7), the Delaware legislature amended section 145 of the Delaware General
Corporation Law. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. VIII, § 145 (1986) (amending aa145 of Delaware
corporation law); Black & Sparks, Analysis of the 1986 Amendments to the Delaware
Corporation Law, PRENTicE-HALL CORPORATiO N 312 (1986) [hereinafter Black & Sparks]
(discussing 1986 amendments to Delaware corporation law). Section 102 (b)(7) provides a
solution to liability of outside directors. Black & Sparks, supra, at 312. Outside directors are
board members that are independent of the corporation. E. BRODSKY & M. ADAMsKY, LAW
OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS - RIGHTS, DuTrs, AND LIAatirris ch.2, at 7 (1984)
[hereinafter LAW OF CORPORATE OFFICERS]. Section 145, alternatively, provides the solution of
indemnification for liability of corporate officers, inside directors, employees, and agents.
Black & Sparks, supra, at 312. Inside directors are board members that the corporation
employed. LAW OF CORPORATE OFFICERS, supra, at ch.2, at 7. Through indemnification,
corporations may reimburse inside directors for legal expenses, fines, judgments, and settlements
incurred in defending suits related to the corporation. Id. The Delaware legislature amended
section 145 (b) to hold officers liable only for gross negligence rather than ordinary negligence
as in the prior statute. Black & Sparks, supra, at 312. The change in section 145 (e) shifts the
burden of proof of entitlement to indemnification from the claimant to the corporation after
the corporation has advanced litigation expenses to the claimant. Id. at 313. Another change
in section 145 (e) allows advances of legal fees by a general authorization in bylaw provisions,
the articles of incorporation, or contracts, rather than by a case-by-case evaluation. Id. Finally,
section 145 (f) is a legislative statement that indemnification under section 145 is not exclusive.
Id. Section 145, therefore, does not affect a director's right to seek other mechanisms of
indemnification from the corporation such as an individual indemnification contract. Id. While
section 102 (b)(7) applies to outside directors, inside directors also benefit from relaxed liability
standards through the amendments to section 145. Id.
19871
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limiting or completely eliminating director liability for breaches of the direc-
tors' duty of due care.'4 The amendment, though, only applies to outside
directors. 5 Outside directors have no connection with the corporation, and
serve as independent monitors of corporate activity. 16 Inside directors, in
contrast, generally are officers or employees of the corporation. 17 By only
applying to outside directors, the amendment attempts to encourage outside
directors to continue serving on boards. 18 The amendment, however, does not
excuse outside directors for violations of their duty of loyalty to the com-
pany.' 9 Furthermore, the amendment does not excuse a director from liability
for: acts not performed in good faith, conduct involving intentional violations
of the law, payment of unlawful dividends, unlawful stock repurchases, and
transactions resulting in personal benefit accruing to the director.20 The
amendment also does not impair available equitable remedies. 2' Finally, the
amendment gives shareholders the option of imposing a specific dollar cap
or other limitation on director liability, rather than voting to relieve directors
from all financial liability for breaches of the duty of care.22
14. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. VIII, § 102 (b)(7) (1986) (provision allowing shareholders
to relieve directors from financial liability for duty of care violations); infra notes 24-44 and
accompanying text (discussing directors' fiduciary duty of care and business judgment rule).
The duty of care requires that a director act with the care of an ordinary person in a similar
position when carrying out his responsibilities to the corporation. LAW OF CORPORaTE OFFICERS,
supra note 13, at ch. 2, at 1.
15. See Greenhouse, Liability Curb Aids Directors, N.Y. Times, Aug. 12, 1986, at D2,
col. I (stating amendment does not affect liability of inside directors); Black & Sparks, supra
note 13, at 312 (implying continued liability for inside directors by predicting that officers will
refer risky decisions to protected directors); Crossen, Companies Ask Holders To Limit
Liability, Wall St. J., Oct. 7, 1986, at 35, col. 3 (stating that amendment applies only to
outside directors); supra note 13 and accompanying text (§ 102 (b)(7) addresses insurance crisis
for outside directors, while § 145 provides expanded indemnification solution for inside
directors).
16. See LAW OF CORPORATE OFFICERS, supra note 12, at ch. 2, at 7 (defining outside
director); infra note 28 and accompanying text (listing activities required of outside director).
Cf. LAW OF CORPOATE OFFICERS, supra note 13, at ch.2, at 7 (describing activities of inside
directors as active participation in daily affairs of corporation and receipt of full-time
compensation).
17. See LAW OF CORPORATE OFFICERS, supra note 13, at ch.2, at 7 (defining inside
director).
18. See Black & Sparks, supra note 13 (stating purpose of amendment is to attract
directors to serve on boards).
19. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. VIII, § 102 (b)(7) (1986) (stating that amendment does not
address duty of loyalty violations); see infra notes 47-50 and accompanying text (discussing
fiduciary duty of loyalty). The fiduciary duty of loyalty requires that a director maintain
undivided and unqualified loyalty to the corporation. LAW OF CoRPoaATE OFFI cERs, supra
note 13, at ch. 3, at 1.
20. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. VIII, § 102 (b)(7) (1986) (listing directors' actions that
amendment does not address).
21. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. VIII, § 102 (b)(7) (1986) (amendment does not eliminate
equitable remedies); Black & Sparks, supra note 13, at 312 (stating that section 102 (b)(7) does
not eliminate the availability of equitable remedies such as injunctions or rescissions based on
breaches of duty of care).
22. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. VIII, § 102 (b)(7) (1986) (stating that shareholders may
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While allowing shareholders to reduce directors' financial liability, the
amendment differentiates between breaches of the duty of care and breaches
of the duty of loyalty.2 Specifically, the amendment only applies to breaches
of the duty of care. 24 The duty of care requires that directors act with the
degree of care that an ordinarily prudent person would exercise in similar
circumstances.? Specific requirements of the fiduciary duty of care often are
absent in state statutes.? Rather, the judiciary traditionally has determined
the specific requirements of the duty of care.27 The duty of care requires that
directors attend directors' meetings, gather adequate information upon which
to make decisions, carefully review the information provided, and monitor
activities delegated to officers. 28 The underlying premise of the duty of care
is that a director must act responsibly, and should not function as a director
without assuming the accompanying responsibilities.
29  I.
An important development in the duty of care is the business judgment
rule. 0 The business judgment rule presumes that boards exercise sound
business judgment. 31 More specifically, a court will not disturb a board's
decision if the board attributes the decision to a rational business, purpose. 32
Directors must satisfy four prerequisites when seeking the protection of the
business judgment rule.33 Directors must be disinterested in the transaction. 34
impose a limitation upon director liability). Examples of limitations that shareholders may
approve include a stated maximum dollar level of liability, or limited liability for certain types
of transactions. Black & Sparks, supra note 13, at 312.
23. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. VIII, § 102 (b)(7) (1986) (stating that amendment does not
apply to duty of loyalty violations); infra notes 25-51 and accompanying text (describing and
defining directors' duty of care and duty of loyalty).
24. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. VIII, § 102 (b)(7) (1986) (allowing shareholders to vote to
relieve directors of liability for violations of duty of care).
25. See Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132, 152 (1891) (describing duty of care standard
as care that ordinary, prudent, and diligent men would exercise in circumstances); W. GRANGE,
CORPORATION LAW FOR OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS: A GUIDE TO CORRECT PROCEDURE 402, 405
(1935) (describing duty of care and diligence applicable to directors); LAW OF CORPORATE
OFFICERS, supra note 13, at ch. 2, at 1 (1984) (discussing directors' duty of care).
26. See Soderquist, Toward A More Effective Corporate Board: Reexamining Roles of
Outside Directors, 52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1341, 1342 (1977) (describing lack of specific director
responsibilities in state statutes).
27. See LAW OF CORPORATE OFFICERS, supra note 13, at ch.2, at 3 (stating that courts
have determined specific functions of directors).
28. See id. at ch. 2, at I (listing responsibilities that duty of care imposes upon directors).
29. See id. at ch. 2, at 2 (describing rationale of duty of care).
30. See Soderquist, supra note 26, at 1345-46 (business judgment rule modifies duty of
care standard); supra note 13 (defining duty of care).
31. See Arsht, In Staunch Defense of Delaware, Commentaries on Corporate Structure
and Governance, ALI-ABA Symposiums 238, 240 (1978) (defining business judgment rule).
32. See Cox, Compensation, Deterrence, and the Market as Boundaries for Derivative
Suit Procedures, 52 GEo. VAsH. L. RFv. 745, 761-62 (1984) (stating that business judgment
rule requires that directors' decisions be rational).
33. See Hinsey, Duty of Care; Liability for Negligence; Supervision and Monitoring,
1983 A.B.A. SEC. OF LITIo. ANNUAL MEETING, 8-9 (listing prerequisites to use of business
judgment rule as shield against director liability).
34. See id. (directors should receive no personal benefit from and have no personal
interest in corporate transaction).
1987]
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Directors also must exercise due care.35 Directors must not abuse their
discretion. 36 Finally, directors must act in good faith.37 If a director fails to
satisfy any of the prerequisites, then the business judgment rule will not shield
a director's actions.38 Courts have used the business judgment rule to protect
directors from liability for ordinary negligence.39 The business judgment rule
prevents judicial evaluation of directors' erroneous business decisions. 40 In
protecting directors from personal liability for honest mistakes, the business
judgment rule encourages risk-taking by directors thus fostering corporate
growth. 4' Furthermore, the business judgment rule enables a corporation to
obtain competent directors who do not fear financial exposure. 42 The business
judgment rule narrows the duty of care from the ordinary care standard to
require only that directors have a reasonable basis for their decisions. 43 The
9availability of more attractive business alternatives is immaterial to the business
judgment rule's protection of a reasonable decision because the business
judgment rule only requires that a decision be rational in the circumstances. 44
The business judgment rule protects directors from liability for decisions
which, while reasonable at the time, prove to be erroneous. 45
Protecting only errors in judgment, the business judgment rule does not
excuse directors from breaches of the duty of loyalty.46 Similarly, the amend-
35. See id. (directors should make reasonable attempts to analyze available information
and follow analysis with informed decision).
36. See id. (directors should act in best interests of corporation and shareholders).
37. See id. (directors must act in good faith).
38. See id. (all prerequisites to business judgment rule are necessary to allow directors
to invoke protection of business judgment rule).
39. See Arsht, supra note 31, at 240 (business judgment rule presupposes exercise of due
care, thus eliminating liability for ordinary negligence); infra notes 40-43 and accompanying
text (business judgment rule facilitates director decision making). See, e.g., Pogostin v. Rice,
480 A.2d 619, 627 (Del. 1984) (court found dismissal of shareholder derivative suit was
informed decision and protected by business judgment rule); Edelman v. Phillips Petroleum
Co., C.A. No. 7899 (Del. Ch. Feb. 12, 1985) (court uses business judgment rule to protect
directors' use of takeover defense); Thompson v. ENSTAR Corp., C.A. No. 7641 (Del. Ch.
Aug. 16, 1984) (applying business judgment rule to directors' action in proxy contest).
40. See Easterbrook and Jarrell, Do Targets Gain From Defeating Tender Offers?, 59
N.Y.U. L. Rv. 277, 277 (1984) (discussing policy underlying business judgment rule). The
policy deterring judicial intervention relies on the desire to prohibit ill-equipped courts from
making strictly business decisions. W. GROENING, THE MoDERN CosoRATE MANAGER: RE-
SPONSIBMITY AND REGULATION 36 (1981).
41. See Herzel & Katz, The Business of Judging Business Judgment, 41 Bus. LAW.
1187, 1189 (1985) (stating that business judgment rule generates corporate boldness needed for
entrepreneurial development).
42. See DELAWARE LAW, supra note 4, at 78 (1985) (explaining that effect of business
judgment rule is to attract directors to corporation).
43. See Cox, supra note 32, at 761-62 (discussing effect of business judgment rule on
duty of care).
44. See id. (discussing effect of alternative decisions on director's ability to invoke
protection of business judgment rule).
45. See supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text (discussing requirements of business
judgment rule).
46. See DE.AWARE LAW, supra note 4, at 74 (stating that directors violating duty of
loyalty may not invoke protection of business judgment rule).
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ment retains director liability for breaches of the duty of loyalty. 47 The duty
of loyalty requires that a director act honestly, loyally, and in good faith in
his relationship with the corporation.48 The duty of loyalty extends to actions
by directors falling under the general category of conflicts of interest.
49
Specifically, the duty of loyalty prohibits directors from seizing corporate
opportunities, participating in competing businesses, using confidential infor-
mation, or other similar acts. Ultimately, the fiduciary duty of loyalty
attempts to prevent self-dealing by directors in corporate fiduciary relation-
ships.s"
Leaving untouched the fiduciary duty of loyalty, the Delaware legislature
adopted the new amendment in response to the recent threat to Delaware's
profitable position in the incorporation market arising out of the shortage of
Directors' and Officers' liability insurance (D & 0). 52 In the past, D & 0
policies were available that provided coverage for corporate reimbursement
and individual liability.5 3 Recently, however, substantial changes have occurred
in the area of D & 0 insurance. 54 Insurance companies have withdrawn D &
O coverage because of rising numbers of claims and adverse judgments and
settlements." D & 0 policies that remain available charge premium rates that
47. See DEL. CODE AN. tit. VIII, § 102 (b)(7) (1986) (stating that amendment does
not address violations of directors' duty of loyalty); supra note 19 (defining duty of loyalty).
48. See V. FLETCHER, 3 CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAv OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 838
(Supp. 1985) (defining duty of loyalty).
49. See W. KNEPPER, LIABILTY OF CoRPoRATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS 50 (3d ed.
1978). Conflicts of interest involve situations in which a director utilizes his position to obtain
personal benefit. Id. Conflicts of interest violate the duty of loyalty requirement that directors
not profit personally from corporate transactions. Id. at 8.
50. See N. LATTIN, LATTIN ON CORPORATIONS § 79, at 283 (2d ed.) (1971) [hereinafter
Lattin] (describing breaches of duty of loyalty).
51. See Responsibilities of Corporate Officers and Directors Under Federal Securities
Laws, 2 ConoRATIoN LAW GulDE.(CCH) 16 (1986) (discussing underlying premise of duty of
loyalty).
52. See Olson, The D & 0 Insurance Gap: Strategies for Coping, Legal Times, Mar.
3, 1986,. at 25, col. I (describing D & 0 insurance and current shortage); infra notes 53-57
and accompanying text (defining and discussing Directors' and Officers' liability insurance);
supra notes 4-12 and accompanying text (discussing Delaware's preeminence in incorporation
market).
53. See Olson, supra note 52, at 25 (describing D & 0 coverage). D & 0 policies insured
the corporation for amounts paid out through indemnification of directors and officers by the
corporation. Id. D & 0 policies provided direct benefits to directors and officers that courts
found personally liable. Id.
54. See Baum & Byrne, The Job Nobody Wants, Bus. WK., Sept. 8, 1986, at 56
(discussing changes in D & 0 market); infra notes 55-57 and accompanying text (discussing
changes in D & 0 market).
55. See Lewin, Director Insurance Drying Up, N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1986, at DI, col.
3 (discussing decline in D & 0 insurance availability); Darin, Most of Armada's Directors
Resign Over Insurance, Wall St. J., Feb. 5, 1986, at 40, col.3 (describing factors contributing
to D & 0 insurance crisis); Olson, supra note 52, at 25 (discussing D & 0 insurance shortage).
But see Greenhouse, supra note 15, at D2 (quoting Harvey J. Goldschmid, professor of law
at Columbia University, who contends that D & 0 crisis also is result of litigation on
environmental, products liability, and securities issues).
1987]
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are fifteen to twenty times as expensive as previous rates and frequently have
higher deductible amounts. 6 Similarly, many available policies exclude cov-
erage for takeover violations and shareholder derivative claims.17 With the
frequent number of shareholder suits and takeovers,58 directors have become
more cautious about accepting directorships and risking personal assets. 9
Directors fear that courts will hold the directors personally liable for negligent
actionsA0 To combat the fear of personal liability, directors traditionally relied
upon the availability of D & 0 coverage before accepting employment
positions. 61 Currently, however, the insurance shortage has forced many
potential directors to refuse to accept positions. 62 Moreover, uninsured direc-
tors presently serving on boards are approaching critical decisions with
unprecedented caution. 63
While the Delaware legislature primarily directed the new amendment at
relieving the insurance crisis by eliminating financial liability for directors,
the amendment also serves as the latest effort by the Delaware General
Assembly to relax the corporate liabilities of business and management 4
Prior to the enactment of the amendment, the business judgment rule pro-
56. See Olson, supra note 52, at 25 (describing increased expense of D & 0 insurance).
57. Id.
58. See Baum & Byrne, supra note 54, at 56 (discussing increased litigation against
directors); M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, TAKEOVERS & FREEzEOUTS 1-4 (1978) [hereinafter
Lipton & Steinberger]. A takeover is an attempt by a bidder to gain control of a company by
acquiring outstanding shares. Id. See Lattin, supra note 50, at 413. A shareholder derivative
suit is an action that shareholders bring to enforce a corporate right against the corporation's
directors or managers. Lattin, at 413.
59. See Lewin, supra note 55, at D4 (discussing directors' fears of liability for judgments
in absence of D & 0 coverage); Bennett, Board Members Draw Fire and Some Think Twice
About Serving, Wall St. J., Feb. 5, 1986, at 1, col. 6 (describing directors' concerns about
continuing to serve on boards because of lack of available insurance protection); Baum &
Byrne, supra note 54, at 56 (directors are unwilling to continue serving for fear of personal
liability).
60. See Bacon, Directors: The Heat's On, AcRoss THE BOARD, Jan. 1986, at 13 (directors
fear personal liability for negligence); Olson, The D & 0 Insurance Disaster, AcRoss THE
BOARD, July/Aug. 1986, at 38 (describing current public trend of requiring greater board
accountability). The decision of the Delaware Supreme Court in Smith v. Van Gorkom, which
imposed liability on directors for gross negligence, is the source of much of directors' concerns
regarding personal liability. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). Lewin, Delaware
Law Allows Less Liability, N.Y. Times, June 19, 1986, at Dl, col. 1; infra notes 131-59 and
accompanying text (discussing Van Gorkom and fear that Van Gorkom decision generated
among directors).
61. See Olson, supra note 52, at 25 (discussing directors' traditional reliance on D & 0
coverage).
62. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text (describing directors' refusal to accept
board positions because of fear of personal liability for judgments).
63. See Baum & Byrne, supra note 54, at 60 (describing cautious director behavior as
result of D & 0 shortage); Herzel & Harris, Uninsured Boards Mount Weak Defense, Nat'l
L. J., April 21, 1986, at 36 (predicting that uninsured boards will remain passive during crisis
moments requiring critical decision making).
64. See infra notes 65-72 and accompanying text (tracing gradual relaxation of standards
of director liability by Delaware General Assembly).
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tected directors of Delaware-based corporations from liability for ordinary
negligence in the exercise of the duty of care.65 Directors remained liable,
however, for gross negligence arising from breaches of the duty of care. 66
The amendment excuses directors for gross negligence.6 7 Directors, therefore,
currently are shielded from liability for all negligence.6 The amendment
protects director actions that are sufficiently uninformed to fall beyond the
protection of the business judgment rule and yet are not violations of the
duty of loyalty.6 9 In the past, there arose few cases in which courts held
directors liable for violating the duty of care.70 Courts generally invoked the
business judgment rule to protect directors' actions.7' Recently, however,
issues of grossly negligent board actions are receiving attention from the
public as a result of a trend toward board accountability.7 2 The amendment,
however, operates to halt possible further development of cases holding
directors liable for negligence in the exercise of the directors' duty of care.
73
Relieving directors of liability for all negligence, section 102 (b)(7) has
generated extensive debate among commentators.7 4 Supporters of the amend-
ment strenuously defend the amendment's attributes.75 Delaware officials argue
that the amendment fulfills a policy of encouraging individuals to perform
the socially valuable monitoring functions of an outside director by freeing
65. See Soderquist, supra note 26, at 1348 (describing business judgment rule's protection
of directors from liability for ordinary negligence); supra note 39 and accompanying text
(discussing business judgment rule exculpating directors for ordinary negligence).
66. H. HENN, LAW OF CoRPoRATIoNs 453 (2d ed. 1970) (noting that directors are negligent
in failing to perform board responsibilities).
67. See Black & Sparks, supra note 13, at 312 (stating that charter provisions adopted
under new amendment absolve directors of liability for gross negligence).
68. See DEL CODE AiNN. tit. VIII, § 102 (b)(7) (1986) (provision allowing shareholders
to relieve directors of liability for breaches of duty of care); Black & Sparks, supra note 13,
at 312 (amendment allows shareholders to relieve directors of liability for negligence).
69. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. VIII, § 102 (b) (7) (1986) (allowing shareholders to eliminate
directors' liability for negligence); supra notes 30-51 and accompanying text (discussing business
judgment rule and duty of loyalty).
70. See Soderquist, supra note 26, at 1348 (discussing lack of cases holding directors
liable for breaches of fiduciary duty in absence of self-dealing).
71. See Bishop, Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the Indemnification of
Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078, 1099 (1968) (stating that few decisions
imposed liability for duty of care violations).
72. See Bacon, supra note 60, at 13 (predicting a continuation of trend of public demand
for greater director accountability).
73. See infra notes 180-91 and accompanying text (analyzing effects of new amendment).
74. See Greenhouse, supra note 15, at D2 (stating that amendment has generated debate
over responsibilities of directors).
75. See Greenhouse, supra note 15, at D2 (commentators describing advantageous features
of new Delaware amendment); Crossen, supra note 15, at 35 (presenting views of supporters
and critics of amendment); Kaplan, Delaware's Misguided Law to Ease Corporate Directors'
Burden, N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 1986, at 22, col. 4 (letter to editor) (answering supporters views
on amendment with criticism); infra notes 75-97 and accompanying text (describing positive
attributes of the amendment).
19871
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:111
directors from the threat of personal liability.76 The insurance crisis forced
the resignations of many directors.77 By relaxing personal liability standards,
the amendment provides incentive for individuals to accept again positions
as directors. 78 Supporters argue vigorously that the amendment will encourage
individuals to serve as directors.
79
In addition to favoring the amendment for its effect of increasing board
service, some commentators supporting the amendment are critical of the
entire duty of care standard. 80 The commentators favor the complete abolition
of the duty of care." One commentator asserts that the application of the
negligence-based duty of care to the corporate director is unsound analyti-
cally.8 2 The commentator reasons that the concept of negligence is based upon
a departure from an ordinary level of behavior, yet there exist no common
standards addressing the function of directors. 83 Other commentators recognize
that stringent judicial imposition of the duty of care renders directors hesitant
to take risks when making business decisions. 84 Director hesitancy precludes
76. See Greenhouse, supra note 15, at D2 (quoting Anthony G. Flynn, counsel to
Delaware Governor Michael N. Castle, discussing beneficial effect of amendment attracting
outside directors to provide independent scrutiny of management); Black & Sparks, supra note
13, at 311 (stating purpose of amendment is to attract outside directors).
77. See Baum & Byrne, supra note 54, at 57 (discussing D & 0 shortage as prompting
directors' resignations); Lewin, supra note 55, at D4 (explaining director refusal to continue
serving on boards); Greenhouse, supra note 15, at D2 (discussing directors' refusals to serve
on boards).
78. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. VIII, § 102 (b)(7) (1986) (amendment relieves directors of
liability for duty of care violations); Black & Sparks, supra note 13, at 311 (explaining
amendment's purpose to attract individuals to serve on boards); Crossen, supra note 15, at 35
(new amendment allows companies to secure outside directors); Greenhouse, supra note 15, at
D2 (new amendment encourages directors to accept board positions).
79. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text (discussing effect of amendment
encouraging directors to accept board positions).
80. See Manning, The Business Judgment Rule and the Director's Duty of Attention:
Time for Reality, 39 Bus. LAW. 1477, 1493 (1984) (discussing flaws in applying duty of care
to corporate directors); Olson, supra note 60, at 40-41 (directors' personal liability is ineffective
to deter director misbehavior); Scott, Corporation Law and the American Law Institute
Corporate Governance Project, 35 STA. L. Rav. 927, 937 (1983) (discussing benefits of
eliminating duty of care).
81. See supra note 80 (discussing abolition of duty of care).
82. See Manning, supra note 80, at 1493-94. The commentator asserts that applying a
traditional duty of care analysis to corporate directors is ineffective. Id. at 1493. Directors
have no standard list of regularly performed tasks. Id. Rather, director functions vary depending
upon the company, situation, and time. Id. The concept of negligence rests upon a clear
understanding of a normal level of performance as opposed to an individual's lesser level of
performance. Id. at 1494. No clear understanding exists regarding the proper role of a director.
Id. Furthermore, juries usually rely on a general standard of conduct in deciding negligence
issues. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF TmX LAW OF TORTS 205 (4th ed.) (1971).
83. See Manning, supra note 79, at 1493-94 (discussing application of negligence concepts
to corporate director action).
84. See Coffee, Litigation and Corporate Governance: An Essay on Steering Between
Scylla and Charybdis, 52 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 789, 802 (1984). Directors facing liability for
negligent acts under the duty of care generally are hesitant to approve high-risk decisions. Id.
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directors from seizing opportunities that may benefit the company and be
desirable for shareholders." Stringently adhering to the duty of care also
prompts directors to initiate costly and time consuming procedures to verify
managerial efforts.86 One commentator summarizes that eliminating the duty
of care saves litigation expenses, the cost of insurance premiums, and time
and money that directors invest in documenting the decision-making proc-
esses.17 Additionally, the absence of a duty of care prompts high-risk decision
making by directors."8 High-risk decision making is crucial in the business
world in order for corporations to maintain a competitive market advantage."
By protecting directors from liability for their actions, the amendment prac-
tically renders the duty of care obsolete, thus fulfilling commentators' desires
to eliminate the duty.90
Proponents of the amendment contend that the concept of eliminating
fiduciary duty is not unusual, but rather is taken from the law of trusts. 9' A
trustee is not liable to beneficiaries for breach of trust in the absence of a
conflict of interest.92 Specifically, exculpatory provisions in the terms of the
trust relieve a trustee from liability for breach of trust.93 The rationale for
allowing the trust instrument to relieve trustees of liability is that the grantor
of the trust has the power to determine a trustee's duties and responsibilities.
4
Similarly, supporters of the amendment argue that the shareholders possess
In contrast, corporate shareholders enjoy limited liability, risking only the amount of their
investment. Id. Shareholders, therefore, favor more risky decisions that carry the potential for
high returns. Id. Frankel, Corporate Directors' Duty of Care: The American Law Institute's
Project on Corporate Governance, 52 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 705, 713 (1984) (discussing critics
contention that duty of care deters directors from taking risks); Herzel & Katz, supra note
41, at 1189 (court's imposing duty of care on directors fails to recognize need for bold director
action).
85. See Coffee, supra note 84, at 802 (discussing results of director hesitancy).
86. See Conard, A Behavioral Analysis of Directors Liability for Negligence, 1972 DUKE
L.J. 895, 904-05 (1972) (threat of director liability results in wasteful time spent seeking to
verify decision making process).
87. See Scott, Corporation Law and the American Law Institute Corporate Governance
Project, 35 STN. L. REv. 927, 937 (1983) (listing benefits of abolition of duty of care
standard).
88. See id. (elimination of duty of care prompts high-risk decision making by removing
threat of personal liability).
89. See Herzel & Katz, supra note 41, at 1189 (describing situations when exercise of
caution resulted in losses to competitors).
90. See supra notes 80-88 and accompanying text (describing commentators' arguments
for abolition of duty of care).
91. See Victor, Statutory Response to D & 0 Crisis Studied, Legal Times, Mar. 31,
1986, at 5, col. 3 (tracing theory of elimination of fiduciary duty to law of trusts); RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) OF TRusTs § 222 (1959) (stating that trustee is not liable for good faith negligence).
92. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TRUSTS § 222 (1959) (exculpatory provisions in trusts
relieve trustees of liability to beneficiaries for breaches of trust).
93. Id.
94. See G. BOGERT, LAW OF TRUSTS 248 (4th ed.) (1963) (discussing exculpatory provisions
in trusts).
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the power to approve provisions dictating directors' responsibilities. 9
The supporters also find appealing the democratic nature of the amend-
ment which requires a shareholder vote of approval.6 Specifically, the amend-
ment permits shareholders, rather than directors, to decide whether directors
are liable for violations of the duty of care by approving or rejecting the
proposed charter provision9 Drafted as an enabling provision, the amendment
applies to a corporation only if shareholders approve the change in a
shareholder vote. 98
In spite of the amendment's requirement of shareholder approval, critics
of 102 (b)(7) have been vocal in their objections to the legislation." Stanley
Kaplan, Chicago attorney and former chairman of the American Law Institute
(ALI) Project on Corporate Governance characterizes section 102 (b)(7) as
an invitation to directors to manage inadequately. °0 Kaplan argues that
managers should be liable if they do not perform management duties. 10
Kaplan states that by exempting directors from liability, the amendment
encourages an unsound policy allowing directors to be inattentive and care-
less. 102 One supporter of director accountability explains that the duty of care
provides a mechanism for compensating corporate shareholders that suffer
losses from grossly negligent management. 03 Thus, the duty of care does not
discourage meaningful business activity as some proponents of the new
amendment contend. 0 4 Rather, as critics of the new amendment explain, the
95. See Greenhouse, supra note 15, at D2 (noting that amendment is democratic because
it requires shareholder approval); Crossen, supra note 15, at 35 (discussing shareholder choice
with regard to liability issue); Lewin, supra note 55, at D1 (quoting Wilmington attorney
Rodman Ward commenting that shareholder vote is important element of amendment). Cf.
Greenhouse, supra note 15, at D2 (quoting Harvey J. Goldschmid's doubts regarding share-
holder comprehension of vote on liability provision); Crossen, supra note 15, at 35 (quoting
Elliot J. Weiss discussing lack of shareholder understanding of ramifications of signing proxy).
96. See supra note 95 (discussing democratic nature of amendment).
97. See DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. VIII, § 102 (b)(7) (1986) (requiring shareholder approval
of provision eliminating director liability).
98. See supra note 95 (commentators debate democratic character of amendment).
99. See Greenhouse, supra note 15, at D2 (presenting critics' objections to new amend-
ment).
100. See Kaplan, supra note 75, at 22 (articulating objections to Delaware amendment);
Greenhouse, supra note 15, at D2 (quoting Stanley Kaplan discussing negative effects of new
amendment); see also Crossen, supra note 15, at 35 (enunciating commentators' additional
criticisms of amendment).
101. Kaplan, supra note 75, at 22 (stating that directors should be liable for failures to
perform responsibly); see also Greenhouse, supra note 15, at D2 (arguing that directors should
be responsible for directing).
102. See Kaplan, supra note 75, at 22 (stating that amendment allows directors to behave
irresponsibly); Greenhouse, supra note 15, at D2 (quoting Stanley Kaplan who argues that law
is unsound which allows directors to be inattentive and careless), see also Crossen, supra note
15, at 35 (quoting investment officer Richard Schlefer arguing that eliminating gross negligence
is dangerous because directors are not deterred from careless behavior).
103. See Cox, supra note 32, at 761-62 ( discussing duty of care providing compensation
to shareholders for director negligence).
104. See id. at 762 (contending that duty of care does not restrict business activity). But
see supra notes 80-88 and accompanying text (discussing criticism of duty of care standard).
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duty of care encourages directors to give increased attention to the affairs of
the corporation. 05
Critics of the amendment also state that by allowing directors to give
less attention to corporate responsibilities, the amendment will lead to a
decline in shareholder derivative suits.' 6 Shareholder derivative suits are
actions that corporate shareholders bring against management to enforce
rights belonging to the corporation.'07 The new amendment will decrease
derivative actions because shareholders, in approving exculpatory provisions,
clearly state that directors are not responsible for negligent mismanagement. 0°
The possibility of decreased derivative actions has lured commentators into
debates on the value and effectiveness of shareholder derivative suits."°9 One
supporter of the amendment argues that shareholders often have little faith
that derivative suits will recompense shareholder losses." 0 Other supporters
of the amendment further contend that shareholders will be willing to give
up the right to sue directors as the cost of securing competent directors.,"
Some commentators, however, assert that shareholder derivative suits are
important and necessary elements of shareholder ownership." 2 Finally, com-
mentators express concern that the new statute may have gone too far in
relaxing standards governing the behavior of directors."3 The commentators
105. See Cox, supra note 32, at 761-62 (leading to conclusion that duty of care prompts
directors to perform more responsibly the responsibilities to the corporation).
106. See Victor, supra note 91, at 5 (quoting Leo Herzel stating that eliminating director
liability will discourage shareholder derivative suits); Crossen, supra note 15, at 35 (explaining
that shareholders approving charter provisions under amendment forfeit right to sue directors).
Shareholder derivative suits are actions that shareholders bring to seek recovery for wrongs
that the corporation has suffered. KNEPPER, LiABmiTY OF CoRPoRATE OFFICERS AND DntaCTORS
526 (3d ed. 1978). The plaintiff shareholder either must have been a shareholder at the time
of the contested transaction, or have received his interest in the corporation since the transaction
by operation of law. Id. at 528. Plaintiff shareholder then must make a demand upon the
directors of the corporation to initiate suit on behalf of the corporation, or allege in the
shareholder's complaint that a demand on the directors would be futile. Id. at 537. Share-
holders, by approving provisions eliminating directors' duty of care, also eliminate a basis for
holding directors liable for harming the corporation. Crossen, supra note 15, at 35.
107. See Lattin, supra note 50, at 414 (defining shareholder derivative actions).
108. See Victor, supra note 91, at 5 (quoting Lewis S. Black, Jr. recognizing that limiting
director liability may eliminate shareholders' ability to receive compensation for corporate
wrongs thus eliminating incentive for shareholder derivative suits).
109. See infra notes 110-12 and accompanying text (discussing debate over shareholder
derivative suits).
110. See Victor, supra note 91, at 5 (quoting Herzel's contention that shareholders put
little value in shareholder derivative suits).
111. See id. at 5 (Herzel argues that shareholders will willingly forfeit right to sue
directors); Crossen, supra note 15, at 35 (quoting Wilmington attorney and amendment drafter
Gilchrist Sparks' belief that shareholders will weigh right to sue directors against need for
qualified directors and choose to relieve directors of liability).
112. See Victor, supra note 91, at 5 (discussing shareholder derivative suits). John Small
of Prickett, Jones, Elliott, Kristol & Schnee states that derivative suits serve a salutary purpose.
Id. Edward M. McNally of Morris, James, Hitchens & Williams states that derivative actions
serve as an important policing device. Id.
113. See Greenhouse, supra note 15, at D2 (summarizing critics' views on detrimental
effect of new amendment).
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fear that the amendment will be significant in prompting Congress to enact
a uniform law of incorporation.1
4
The director liability issue already has generated responses less severe
than congressional action."5 Most similar to the Delaware model is an Indiana
statute that combines limited exculpation and indemnification of directors." 6
The Indiana statute imposes liability upon directors for breaches of the duty
of care that involve willful misconduct and recklessness.1 7 The Indiana
legislature, however, eliminated liability for all director negligence." 8 Thus,
by eliminating the most common negligence claims, the statute attempts to
solve the insurance problem." 9 The Indiana statute is similar to the Delaware
amendment in shielding directors from liability for negligence. 20 The Delaware
amendment, however, also excuses directors from liability for reckless disre-
gard of shareholder interests, thus eliminating all requirements that directors
manage responsibly.12 ' While the Indiana statute and the Delaware amendment
are similar, the impact of the Delaware amendment will be more substantial
due to the large number of companies incorporated in Delaware. '2
While Delaware and Indiana seek to remedy the D & 0 crisis by statute,
individual corporations in other states are seeking alternatives to D & 0
policies.' 21 In some states, companies are offering indemnification contracts
114. See Kaplan, supra note 75, at 22 (warning that amendment may prompt congressional
examination of corporate governance); Greenhouse, supra note 15, at D2 (quoting Harvey J.
Goldschmid raising question of congressional action in corporate law area).
115. See Herzel & Harris, supra note 63, at 37 (discussing various solutions other than
congressional action to D & 0 insurance problem); Rovner, D & 0 Indemnity: Discrete
Contracts Seen as an Option, Legal Times, Nov. 25, 1985, at 1, col. 3 (describing substitutes
for D & 0 insurance that corporations use to remedy D & 0 crisis).
116. See IND. CODE § 23-1-35-1 (1986) (exculpating directors from financial liability);
Herzel & Harris, supra note 63, at 37 (describing Indiana's new indemnification statute); infra
notes 117-119 and accompanying text (discussing provisions of Indiana statute).
117. See IND. CODE § 23-1-35-1 (e) (1986) (listing directors' actions that statute does not
address); Herzel & Harris, supra note 63, at 37 (identifying limitations on application of
Indiana statute).
118. See IND. CODE § 23-1-35-1 (1986) (eliminating director liability for due care violations);
Herzel & Harris, supra note 63, at 37 (effect of Indiana statute is to eliminate liability for
negligence).
119. See Herzel & Harris, supra note 63, at 37 (stating that Indiana statute effectively
eliminates negligence claims).
120. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text (discussing Delaware amendment
relieving directors of liability for negligence).
121. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. VIII, § 102 (b) (7) (1986) (provision eliminating director
liability for reckless disregard of shareholder interests); Kaplan, supra note 75, at 22 (stating
that Delaware amendment eliminates director liability for
recklessness). The Indiana statute differs from the Delaware amendment in that the Indiana
statute mandatorily applies to corporations without a shareholder vote. Herzel & Harris, supra
note 63, at 37.
122. See supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text (describing nationwide application of
Delaware corporation law).
123. See Rovner, supra note 115, at 1 (describing search by corporations for alternatives
to D & 0 policies).
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to directors.2 4 The contracts are available only in states that have nonexclusive
indemnification statutes.'2 The indemnification contracts represent a compa-
ny's guarantee to indemnify directors for personal liability up to the limits
of the corporation's assets. 26 Indemnification contracts primarily offer security
to individuals, thus inducing individuals to accept board positions. 27 The
efficacy of indemnification contracts as replacements for insurance policies
is questionable, however, since directors will be liable for any judgment
greater than the assets of the company.'2 Other corporations, hoping to
avoid expensive premiums or seeking to provide insurance when none is
available, are securing insurance through company owned subsidiaries or
joining other companies to form mutual insurance funds. 29 The D & 0 crisis
thus generated various responses in addition to the Delaware amendment. 30
An important consideration for corporations deciding whether to utilize
the strategies developed to combat the D & 0 crisis or to take advantage of
the amendment available to Delaware corporations is the effect that the
Delaware courts will give the new amendment.' In spite of the Delaware
judiciary's tendency to render pro-management decisions, 32 many commen-
tators assert that a recent decision of the Delaware Supreme Court generated
a significant amount of fear of personal liability among directors.1 33 In Smith
In addition to statutory and contractual alternatives, the American Law Institute (ALl) also
has addressed the issue of providing a mechanism by which to limit directors liability. PART
VII PRINCPLES OF CORPORATE GovaENANcE § 7.17. ALl is engaged in a continuing project
on corporate governance the aim of which is to draft a comprehensive corporation law. Id.
at § 1.01. Part VII of the current ALI draft contains a provision thatplaces a limit on the
amount of damages for which a director may be liable. Id. at § 7.17. The suggested liability
limit would not be disproportionate to the benefits that the outside director received for serving
the corporation. Id.
124. See, Rovner, supra note 115, at I (describing search for D & 0 alternatives).
125. See, e.g., CoLo. REv. STAT. § 7-3-101 (1)(o)(VI) (1981) (nonexclusive indemnification
statute); DEL. CODE Am. tit. VIII, § 145 (f) (1986) (same); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.42-
12 (f) (1983) (same); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14.A: 3-5 (8) (1973) (same); O-no REv. CODE ANN.
§ 1701.13 (E) (6) (1974) (same); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 410 (f) (1968) (same); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 180.05 (1980) (same). Nonexclusive indemnification statutes allow corporations to
provide indemnification through means beyond the scope of the statute. LAW OF CORPORATE
OFFICERS, supra note 13, at ch.19, at 3.
126. See Rovner, supra note 115, at 2 (describing indemnification contracts and their
effect).
127. See id. at 2 (noting that effect of indemnification contracts is to encourage individuals
to serve on boards).
128. See id. at 2 (discussion of limitations of indemnification contracts). Corporations
only may contract to indemnify directors up to the assets of the company. Id. Court awards
may exceed the company's assets, thus leaving directors personally liable for the excess amount.
Id.
129. See id. at 2 (discussing D & 0 solutions).
130. See supra notes 123-29 and accompanying text (describing solutions to D & 0 crisis).
131. See infra notes 181-92 and accompanying text (discussing potential judicial treatment
of amendment).
132. See Olson, supra note 60, at 42 (identifying Delaware courts' promanagement stance).
133. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). See generally Herzel & Katz, Smith v. Van.Gorkom: The
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v. Van Gorkom,3 4 the Delaware Supreme Court held directors personally
liable for breaching the duty of care. 35 Specifically, directors feared that the
Van Gorkom decision, combined with the lack of D & 0 insurance, forced
directors to risk personal assets when serving on boards. 36 In Van Gorkom,
the Trans Union corporation, a publicly-traded company principally involved
in the railcar leasing business, merged with a subsidiary company of the
Marmon Group, Inc. 37 Prior to the merger, Trans Union experienced diffi-
culty utilizing available investment tax credits. 3 The investment tax credit
problem plagued Trans Union from the late 1960's until 1980 when the senior
management of Trans Union first discussed the alternative of a sale of Trans
Union to a company with a large taxable income. 39 The initial discussion
was preliminary and brief.' 40 Senior management again discussed the solution
of selling Trans Union at a meeting in September of 1980.41 The managers
effected some computations, but did not establish a sale price for Trans
Union shares, nor reach any conclusions regarding a sale. 42 Following the
meeting, defendant Van Gorkom, chairman and chief executive officer of
Trans Union, formulated a sales proposal and negotiated the terms of the
sale of Trans Union to an owner of the Marmon Group. 43 The chief executive
officer first proposed the merger to the Trans Union board in a twenty-
minute presentation, 44 The directors approved the sale of Trans Union during
Business of Judging Business Judgment, 41 Bus. LAw. 1187 (1985) (discussing impact of Van
Gorkom decision); Manning, Reflections and Practical Tips on Life in the Boardroom After
Van Gorkom, 41 Bus. LAW. 1 (1985) (commenting upon effect of Van Gorkom); Mining the
Safe Harbor? The Business Judgment Rule After Trans Union, 10 DEL. J. CORP. L. 545 (1985)
[hereinafter Mining the Safe Harbor] (discussing effect of Van Gorkom decision on business
judgment rule); Moskin, Trans Union: A Nailed Board, 10 DEL. J. CoRp. L. 405 (discussing
commentary following Van Gorkom decision).
134. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
135. Id. at 893.
136. See Lewin, supra note 55, at D26 (discussing D & 0 crisis and fear that Van
Gorkom generated).
137. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 864.
138. Id. at 864. During the late 1970's, defendant lobbied Congress seeking investment
tax credits refundable in cash to firms unable to use the credits. Id. at 864-65.
139. Id. at 865. The Trans Union senior management met on August 27, 1980 at which
time defendant Van Gorkom reported on his lobbying efforts. Id. The Trans Union managers
preliminarily discussed a variety of alternatives to the investment tax credit problem. Id.
140. Id. at 865.
141. Id. at 865.
142. Id. At the September 1980 meeting, Trans Union's chief financial officer again
proposed a sale of the company. Id. Officers of Trans Union roughly calculated needed cash
flow for a sale. Id. The officers did not make extensive calculations, thus the officers did not
possess sufficient data with which to make an informed decision. Id.
143. Id. at 866. Defendant and Trans Union chief executive officer approached Pritzker,
an owner of the Marmon Group, with a buy-out proposal without consulting the board of
directors of Trans Union. Id. Through a series of meetings, Van Gorkom and Pritzker
negotiated the specific terms of the merger and discussed financing for the deal. Id. at 867.
144. Id. at 868. Van Gorkom presented the proposed merger to the senior management
of Trans Union one hour before the board meeting. Id. Senior management was opposed to
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the same meeting.1 45 The entire procedure lasted approximately two hours. 46
Plaintiffs, shareholders of Trans Union, brought an action in the Delaware
Court of Chancery seeking damages and rescission of the merger.1 47 Plaintiffs
alleged that the directors violated the duty of care in approving the merger
because the directors did not make an informed decision. 4 The Court of
Chancery, however, determined that the directors' decision to approve the
merger was an informed decision. 49 Thus, the Court of Chancery protected
the directors' action under the business judgment rule.5 0 The Supreme Court
of Delaware, however, reversed the decision of the Court of Chancery,
finding that the directors failed to exercise informed business judgment in
deciding to approve the sale of Trans Union.'-" The court concluded, therefore,
that the directors had been grossly negligent. 52 The court noted that the
directors had received no prior notice of the intended sale, and were not
familiar with the defendant's method of determining the sale price, nor with
the intrinsic value of the company. 53 The Delaware court further found that
the directors acted with undue haste in an absence of supporting documen-
tation.'U Although the sale price was substantially higher than the current
market price, thus providing a profit to shareholders, the court held the
directors personally liable for failing to make an informed decision."',
In holding the Trans Union directors personally liable, the Van Gorkom
court demonstrated that the Delaware courts would scrutinize more strictly
directors' actions.5 6 Some commentators regard Van Gorkom as the Delaware
the merger. Id. Van Gorkom, however, proceeded to present the merger to the board. Id.
Van Gorkom called the board meeting with only one day's notice. Id. Van Gorkom did not
inform board members of the purpose of the meeting. Id. Moreover, copies of the proposed
merger were not available at the meeting. Id.
145. Id at 869. On September 22, 1980, Trans Union announced the merger agreement
with Marmon. Id. Because of dissent and threatened resignations of senior management, Van
Gorkom secured director approval of amendments to the merger agreement at a meeting. Id.
The board, in addition to approving the amendments, authorized Van Gorkom to hire an
investment firm to solicit other potential bidders. Id. at 869. The investment firm located only
one bidder and that bidder refused to make an offer unless Trans Union rescinded the
agreement with Marmon. Id. at 870.
146. Id. at 869. The board formally executed the merger agreement at a party that Van
Gorkom hosted to celebrate the opening of the opera season. Id. None of the directors read
the amendment before signing. Id.
147. Id. at 863.
148. Id. at 864.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 871.
152. Id. at 881.
153. Id. at 874. In approving the merger, the directors relied entirely upon Van Gorkom's
pres~mtatidn in approving the merger. Id. The Delaware Supreme Court found neither evidence
or a written summary of the merger nor documentation of the method of price determination.
Id.
154. Id.
155. Id, at 893.
156. See Mining the Safe Harbor, supra note 133, at 545 (discussing impact of Van
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court's response to a growing public desire to require higher standards of
accountability from directors. 5 7 The Van Gorkom court did not create new
law, but rather applied a previously dormant gross negligence standard to
directors' actions. 58 Van Gorkom served to warn directors that the business
judgment rule is not an absolute defense to shareholders' negligence claims. 5 9
The Van Gorkom court made clear that the Delaware courts would analyze
more closely directors' efforts to prepare for decision making. 16
After the Van Gorkom decision, however, the Delaware Supreme Court
again invoked the business judgment rule to protect directors in Moran v.
Gorkom); Schatz, Directors Feel the Legal Heat, N.Y. Times, Dec. 15, 1985, sect. 3, at 12,
col. 3 (discussing Delaware courts scrutiny of director performance).
157. See Olson, supra note 60, at 42 (discussing Delaware court's motivation in rendering
Van Gorkom); see also Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173,
176 (Del. 1986) (holding that directors breached duty of care). In Revlon Inc. v. MacAndrews
& Forbes Holdings, Inc., the Delaware Supreme Court found directors liable for a breach of
the fiduciary duty of care. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 176. The Revlon case involved efforts by
Pantry Pride, Inc. to acquire control of Revlon, Inc. Id. at 176. In defending against the
Pantry Pride takeover attempt, the directors of Revlon entered into a lock-up option with
Forstmann Little. Id. at 179. A lock-up option is a defensive mechanism used to discourage
competitive offers by other potential bidders. Nathan, Lock-Ups and Leg-Ups: The Search for
Security in the Acquisitions Market Place, 13 Am. INsT. SEc. REG. 13, 16 (P.L.I. Course
Handbook No. 373, 1981). The result of the Revlon directors' action was to deter other
possible offers for the company or price competition between current offerors. Revlon, 506
A.2d at 175-76. Thus, the directors deprived shareholders of a higher price per share. Id. The
Delaware Supreme Court found that when the directors realized that Revlon faced certain sale,
the directors' duty shifted from defending against the takeover to securing the best price per
share for stockholders. Id. at 182.
Analyzing the directors' fiduciary duty to the shareholdes, the Revlon court appeared to
employ both the duty of loyalty and the duty of care. Id. at 182. The Revlon court stated
that the Revlon directors breached the duty of loyalty by entering into the lock-up agreement.
Id. at 182. The court, however, concluded by characterizing the board action as a breach of
the duty of care falling outside the protection of the business judgment rule. Id. at 184. One
possible justification for the court's language is the overlap of the element of disinterest of
the business judgment rule with the prohibition against self-dealing found in the duty of loyalty
in the takeover context. DELAWARE LAw, supra note 10, at 80. One element of the business
judgment rule is director disinterest. LAw OF CORPORATE OFmcERs, supra note 13, at ch.2, at
17. Similarly, the duty of loyalty requires that directors have no conflicts of interest. Knepper,
supra note 49, at 50. When a director in the midst of a takeover exhibits self-interest, a court
may examine the action as a breach of the duty of loyalty or as a breach of the duty of care
which the business judgment rule does not protect. DEiAwARE LAW, supra note 10, at 80.
Since the court decided the Revlon case before the effective date of the new amendment, the
court was not making an effort to circumvent the statute. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. VIII, § 102
(b) (7) (effective date July 1, 1986). Rather, the Revlon case presented the possibility that in
specific fact situations courts may manipulate the fiduciary standards. Therefore, if lawyers
draft alleged takeover complaints in duty of loyalty language, courts may hold directors
personally liable for breaches of the duty of loyalty.
158. See Mining the Safe Harbor, supra note 133, at 567 (describing use of existing gross
negligence standard in Van Gorkom decision).
159. See id. (discussing Van Gorkom message to persons serving as directors).
160. See supra note 133 (listing commentators discussing import of Van Gorkom decision).
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Household International, Inc. 61 The court upheld the directors' adoption of
a Preferred Stock Purchase Rights Plan (Rights Plan) as a legitimate exercise
of business judgment. 62 In Moran, the board of directors of Household
International, concerned about the current trend of corporate takeovers,
sought the advice of takeover specialists in formulating a defensive strategy
for the company. 63 The specialists recommended adoption of a Rights Plan
to protect the company from potential hostile takeovers.'64 A Right is an
instrument issued to a shareholder giving the shareholder an option to
purchase certain stock in the corporation.1 6 The Rights Plan in Moran
provided that common stockholders would receive one Right per share of
stock upon the announcement of a tender offer for 30% of Household's
shares, or upon the acquisition by a single shareholder of 20% of Household's
stock.'16 The board subsequently approved the plan.
167
The plaintiff, chairman of the corporation that was Household's largest
shareholder, filed suit in the Delaware Court of Chancery.'16 The plaintiff
alleged that the Household board lacked authority to adopt the Rights Plan.'
69
Plaintiff also alleged that the Rights Plan interfered with the shareholders'
rights to entertain hostile tender offers and conduct proxy contests. 70 Finally,
161. 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985); see also Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d
946 (Del. 1985) (Delaware court invoked the business judgment rule to protect directors). In
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., the Supreme Court of Delaware approved the directors'
decision to effect a self-tender offer in an effort to defeat a hostile tender offer. Unocal Corp.
v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 949 (Del. 1985). A self-tender offer is a defensive
mechanism involving an offer by the target company to repurchase its own shares of stock. I
A. FLEISCHER, TENDER OFFERS: DEFENSES, RESPONSES, AND PLANNING 378.2 (1985). The Unocal
court held that the business judgment rule protected the boards' decision. 493 A.2d at 949.
The directors of Unocal analyzed the nature of the hostile takeover bid and its effect on the
corporation. Id. at 950. Upon completing the analysis, the board instituted a reasonable action
in the self-tender offer to protect shareholder interests. Id. at 959.
162. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1348. A Preferred Share Purchase Rights Plan (Rights Plan)
is a takeover defense mechanism designed to protect stock values for shareholders of a company
whose stock is currently selling in the market for less than the long-term value of the stock.
Lipton & Steinberger, supra note 58, at 6-44.
163. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1349. Investment counselors distributed information concerning
the Rights Plan to directors prior to the August 14 board meeting. Id. The counselors attended
the meeting and discussed the operation of the Plan. Id.
164. Id.
165. See Lipton & Steinberger, supra note 58, at 6-44 (defining Preferred Share Purchase
Rights Plan).
166. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1358. The Rights Plan enabled common stockholders to
purchase 1/100 share of new preferred stock for $100 upon announcement of a tender offer
for 30% of Household's stock. Id. at 1349. Rights also were redeemable for $.50 each. Id. If
a single shareholder acquired 20% of Household's stock, each Right enabled a shareholder to
purchase 1/100 share of preferred stock. Id. Shareholders, however, could not redeem the
Right. Id. If a shareholder chose not to exercise a Right and a merger occurred, the Plan
allowed a shareholder to purchase $200 of the offeror's common stock for $100. Id.
167. Id. at 1349.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 1351.
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plaintiff contended that the board did not exercise informed business judgment
in adopting the plan. 7 ' The Court of Chancery upheld the board's action as
a valid business decision.172 The Delaware Supreme Court, distinguishing
Smith v. Van Gorkom, affirmed the decision of the Court of Chancery.'
In Moran, the Delaware Supreme Court initially discussed the authority
of the board to adopt the Rights Plan. 74 After declaring that the board acted
within its authority, the court progressed to the primary issue of the applic-
ability of the business judgment rule to the board's adoption of the Rights
Plan. 75 Citing Van Gorkom, the court stated that to determine if a business
decision was informed, the court must determine if the directors were grossly
negligent. 76 The court explained that if the directors were grossly negligent,
then the business judgment rule would not apply and the court would hold
the directors personally liable. 7 7 The court found that by examining and
discussing a three-page summary of the plan and several articles on the
takeover environment, the board possessed sufficient information with which
to make a satisfactory evaluation of the Rights Plan and, therefore, the board
was not grossly negligent.17 8 Thus, the court held that the business judgment
rule protected the directors' decision. 79 The court distinguished the actions
of the directors in Moran from the actions of the directors in Van Gorkom
who displayed gross negligence in approving a merger.'1
Shielding directors from liability for gross negligence such as the negli-
gence of the directors in Van Gorkom, the new amendment severely limits
the Delaware courts' ability to protect shareholder interests.'' When facts
exist that bring an action within the context of the duty of loyalty, a court
will continue to scrutinize strictly alleged conflict of interest violations.8 2
171. Id. at 1356.
172. Id. at 1348.
173. Id. at 1348.
174. See id. at 1350-55. In Moran, the Delaware Supreme Court noted that the Delaware
legislature authorized directors adoption of Rights Plans. Id.; see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. VIII,
§ 157 (1986) (granting corporations authority to issue rights or options that enable holders to
purchase stock from corporation). The court concluded that the Rights Plan allowed share-
holders to receive tender offers. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1354. The Moran court also found that
the shareholders' right to conduct proxy contests also remained intact. Id. at 1355.
175. Id. at 1355.
176. Id. at 1356.
177. Id. at 1356.
178, Id. The directors examined in advance of the board meeting a notebook containing
a three-page summary of the Rights Plan and articles on takeovers. Id. The directors also
discussed the Plan with investment counselors. Id. The court found that the preparations were
sufficient to inform directors about the proposal. Id.
179. Id. at 1357.
180. Id. at 1356; see Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 860 (holding directors liable for gross
negligence); supra notes 123-160 and accompanying text (discussing Van Gorkom decision).
181. See Kaplan, supra note 75, at 22 (leading to conclusion that amendment will restrict
shareholders from bringing actions by relieving directors of responsibility to promote share-
holder interests).
182. See Black, supra note 4, at 7 (amendment does not apply to breaches of duty of
loyalty thus amendment does not affect courts' treatment of duty of loyalty violations).
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Otherwise, the amendment will provide additional legislative support for the
courts to embrace pro-management policies.'8 3 In the past, the Delaware
courts have attempted to balance Delaware's pro-management policies with
the courts' own perception of the judicial duty to establish and maintain
standards of management conduct in order to protect shareholders.' 84 The
Delaware courts are aware of the state's dependence upon the tremendous
revenues that the state government collects annually from corporate taxes and
franchise fees.' 85 In contrast, the Delaware courts also have been sensitive to
the public trend toward management accountability.1 6 The amendment sim-
plifies the dilemma facing the judiciary.'8 7 In order to solve the dilemma, the
courts will hold directors liable only in instances of conflict of interest.', By
holding directors liable for conflicts of interest, the judiciary will pay tribute
in part to the courts' responsibility to protect shareholders.'89 On the other
hand, by adhering to the statute, courts will continue to lend support to
Delaware's incorporation business.' 90 The effect of the amendment will be to
prohibit the courts from protecting shareholder interests by rendering decisions
similar to Van Gorkom.' 9' The public desire for greater accountability from
directors will not progress in the Delaware court system since the amendment
eliminates the potential for a trend of cases holding directors liable for gross
negligence.' 92
In addition to limiting a trend toward director accountability, the amend-
ment results in a lower standard of director responsibility that is not excused
by the amendment's alleged democratic nature. 93 Forced to consider the
183. See supra note 132 and accompanying text (describing Delaware judiciary's support
of management).
184. See Black, supra note 4, at 7 (describing unique task of Delaware courts in paying
heed to both Delaware's incorporation industry and the judicial duty to maintain standards
of corporate responsibility).
185. See DEtAwARE LAW, supra note 4, at Ix (describing Delaware's corporation-generated
revenues). In 1983, Delaware earned $80,000,000 from corpoate taxes and franchise fees. Id.
186. See Olson, supra note 60, at 38 (noting existence of trend toward holding directors
liable); Baum & Byrne, supra note 54, at 57 (public has an increased expectation of director
behavior).
187. See Black, supra note 4, at 7 (describing difficult task that the Delaware courts
face); infra notes 187-190 and accompanying text (arguing that amendment makes Delaware
judiciary's task easier).
188. See Black & Sparks, supra note 13, at 312 (new amendment effects no change in
duty of loyalty).
189. See Black, supra note 4, at 7 (describing Delaware courts' responsibility to impose
limits on corporate behavior).
190. See supra notes 64-73 and accompanying text (discussing amendment as effort to
relax corporate liability thus supporting Delaware's promanagement stance).
191. See supra note 67 and accompanying text (amendment excuses directors from liability
for gross negligence).
192. See Veasey, Further Reflections on Court Review of Judgments of Directors: Is the
Judicial Process Under Control?, 40 Bus. LAW. 1373, 1382 (1985) (author predicted future
litigation stemming from Van Gorkom decision).
193. See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text (describing democratic features of
amendment); infra notes 194-96 and accompanying text (stating that democratic nature of
amendment does not excuse lowered director standard).
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liability provision as one topic in a proxy vote, shareholders will not under-
stand the import of the vote.'1 Corporations will encourage shareholders to
approve the provisions. 95 Shareholders, however, often will not realize that
they are forfeiting a significant right.P9 Furthermore, the amendment reduces
shareholders' rights to sue directors in derivative actions. 19 The shareholder
derivative suit traditionally is an important mechanism with which to control
director behavior. 9 In approving a provision eliminating director liability,
shareholders often will not realize that they are waiving protection of share-
holder interests.'9 By reducing the availability of derivative actions, the
amendment lessens a director's duty to answer to the owners of a corporation
for the director's actions."
In the past, the business judgment rule protected directors' actions as
long as the directors were acting with the care of an ordinary person in the
same position.201 At the other extreme, the duty of loyalty imposed liability
upon directors for conflict of interest violations. 2°2 Thus, directors feared
liability for grossly negligent actions falling within the gap between the business
judgment rule and the duty of loyalty. 23 Directors should not escape liability
for breaches of the duty of care resulting from gross negligence. 20 4 Directors
should be accountable for failures to accept the responsibility that accompanies
a position on a board. 2°5 Careful and dedicated directors should not enter a
directorship assuming in advance the need for protection from liability for
inattentiveness and lack of preparation.? Supporters of the statute contend
194. See Crossen, supra note 15, at 35 (discussing shareholder approval of provisions by
proxy vote). General Mills, Inc., Burroughs Corp., and Pillsbury Co. already have secured
shareholder approval of liability provisions. Id.
195. See Greenhouse, supra note 15, at D2 (quoting Harvey J. Goldschmid discussing
lack of shareholder understanding of votes on amendment provisions).
196. See Crossen, supra note 15, at 35 (predicting lack of shareholder understanding of
implications of voting away director liability).
197. See supra notes 106-12 and accompanying text (discussing critics' views of adverse
effect of amendment on shareholder derivative suits).
198. See Lattin, supra note 50, at 414 (describing shareholder derivative actions as
instruments of control and self-defense).
199. See Crossen, supra note 15, at 35 (stating that shareholders will not understand that
approval of provisions exempting directors from liability will lessen protection of shareholder
interests).
200. See Kaplan, supra note 75, at 22 (directors virtually will be free from responsibility
to shareholders under amendment).
201. See supra notes 31-45 and accompanying text (discussing traditional protection that
business judgment rule afforded directors).
202. See supra notes 46-51 and accompanying text (discussing duty of loyalty).
203. See Mining the Safe Harbor, supra note 133, at 545 (describing gross negligence
violations as beyond protection of business judgment rule).
204. See Crossen, supra note 15, at 35 (quoting Richard Schlefer contending that directors
should be liable for gross negligence).
205. See Kaplan, supra note 75, at 22 (directors should accept the responsibility of
directorship); supra note 28 and accompanying text (discussing responsibilities of directors).
206. See Farrell, If Directors Are Doing Their Job, They Don't Need Insurance, Bus.
WK., Sept. 8, 1986, at 61 (directors employing common sense need not fear personal liability).
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that directors generally are dedicated persons and will not take advantage of
the relaxation of the standard of care. 271 This rather naive supposition fails
to recognize that if directors truly were dedicated to performing their jobs
thoroughly, the insurance shortage would not have generated fear in direc-
tors. 20 The criticism of directors does not imply that directors are unethical
or opportunistic.2°9 The public, however, is demanding that boards take a
more active role as overseers of the corporation. 210 While increased respon-
sibility will leave directors that serve on multiple boards insufficient time to
satisfy all responsibilities, 21' the demand for greater accountability suggests a
need for a new role for directors.212 Directors should accept fewer board
positions and dedicate more attention to the responsibilities accompanying
the positions.
213
The need to attract corporate directors that are willing to accept the
responsibilities of the position is a serious problem. 21 4 Outside directors provide
valuable independent scrutiny of corporate affairs.2 - One desire of the drafters
of the amendment is to encourage individuals to serve as outside directors.
216
Yet if the amendment, in an effort to attract directors, relieves directors of
liability for failures to perform responsibly, the amendment eliminates the
benefit of an outside director because outside directors need not scrutinize
diligently the affairs of the corporation. 217 Thus, the amendment divests the
role of outside director of the primary function and obligation of providing
corporate oversight.
2 8
207. See Greenhouse, supra note 15, at D2 (quoting Lewis S. Black and Norman Veasey
arguing that directors will not take advantage of having no duty of care standard).
208. See Farrell, supra note 206, at 61 (directors properly performing tasks do not need
liability insurance).
209. See Greenhouse, supra note 15, at D2 (commentators argue that directors are honest
individuals).
210. See Bacon, supra note 60, at 13 (predicting a continuation of public demand for
more effective board performance).
211. See Baum and Byrne, supra note 54, at 58 (describing increased director time
demands).
212. See Baum, 'Professional' Directors: So Many Boards: So Little Time, Bus. WK.,
Sept. 8, 1986, at 59 (suggesting that directors will accept fewer positions because of the
increased demands of board service).
213. See id. at 59 (describing trend of directors serving on fewer boards).
214. See Baum & Byrne, supra note 54, at 56 (discussing shortage of outside directors).
215. See Greenhouse, supra note 15, at D2 (discussing purpose of outside directors); Leech
& Mundheim, The Outside Directors of the Publicly-Held Corporation, 31 Bus. LAW. 1799,
1805 (1976) (describing monitoring function of outside directors). The monitoring function of
outside directors implies that the directors perform diligently and attentively to determine the
best interests of the corporation. Id; see Soloman, Restructuring the Corporate Board of
Directors: Fond Hope-Faint Promise?, 76 MIcH. L. REV. 581, 588 (1978) (discussing role of
outside directors). By asking questions and making suggestions, the board of directors scruti-
nizes management's actions and forces management to address important problems. Id.
216. See Black & Sparks, supra note 13, at 311 (identifying goal of revision committee
to alleviate insurance crisis causing corporations to lose directors).
217. See Kaplan, supra note 75, at 22 (amendment relieves directors of responsibilities to
corporation).
218. See supra note 28 and accompanying text (describing function of outside directors).
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Another result of relieving directors of liability for breaches of the duty
of care is that Delaware has become more attractive to incorporating busi-
nesses. 29 Management, looking for a favorable business climate, certainly will
incorporate in Delaware where director liability is low.M Thus, the amendment
assures Delaware of continued high income from corporate taxes and fees. 22'
The amendment acts as another mechanism to lure businesses to incorporate
in Delaware.m2
Incidently strengthening Delaware's grasp on the incorporation market,
section 102 (b)(7) does aid in alleviating the problems for outside directors
in securing D & 0 insurance.? In addition, relaxed director liability will
make board positions more desirable. 224 Unfortunately, the price for the
change will be a ready pool of directors unwilling to give necessary attention
to the affairs of the company.25 Ultimately, the Delaware amendment is a
substantial obstacle to corporate responsibility.226
STACY D. BLANK
219. See supra notes 64-73 and accompanying text (discussing amendment's promanage-
ment effect).
220. Id.
221. See supra note 185 and accompanying text (describing Delaware's revenue derived
from corporations).
222. See Herzel & Harris, supra note 63, at 37 (warning that Delaware should enact law
solving insurance crisis in order to attract businesses).
223. See supra notes 13-25 and accompanying text (discussing provisions of amendment).
224. See supra notes 74-79 and accompanying text (describing effect of amendment in
encouraging individuals to accept board positions).
225. See supra notes 205-13 and accompanying text (stating that amendment results in
director inattentiveness).
226. See supra notes 65-73 and accompanying text (describing declining standards of
corporate responsibility).
